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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PHILLIP RoY SMITH, an infant,
by Andrew J. Smith, his
Guardian Ad Litem,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IGNACIO THEODORE GALLEGOS
and WAsATCH CoNSTRUCTION
CoMPANY,
Defendants, Third
Party Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No. 10226

WILLIAM JEWELL JONES and
MIL WHITE MuD SALES CoMPANY,
a corporation
Defendants, Third
Party Defendants and
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellants appeal from a jury verdict finding them
liable for damages and injuries sustained by the respondent
William Jewel Jones arising out of a collision at the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood Road, Salt Lake
County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respondent accepts the statement in the appellants'
brief as to the disposition in the trial court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the jury's verdict in his
favor should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents submit the following statement of facts as
being more in accord with the principle of law that on
appeal the facts will be reviewed in a light most favorable
to the jury's verdict and in fact a more accurate statement
of what actually occurred. The instant action was filed by
Phillip Roy Smith against both the appellants and respondents and Milwhite Mud Sales Company for injuries Smith
allegedly sustained as a result of a collision between the
vehicle operated by the appellant Ignacio Theodore Gallegos and owned by Wasatch Construction Company and
a vehicle owned and operated by the respondent William
J. Jones. Subsequent to the filing of the action, the claim
of Phillip R. Smith was dismissed. Gallegos and Wasatch
Construction Company, the appellants, had cross-claimed
against William J. Jones who in tum had cross-claimed for
damages to his truck and injuries to his person. These latter
claims were the subject of the trial which resulted in averdict for the respondent in the sum of $9,661.46 from which
the appellants appeal.
The collision which is the subject of the instant action
occurred on the 7th day of September, 1961 at 8:30 p.m.
at the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood Road, Salt
Lake County ( R. 24 7) . Redwood Road on the north side
of 3500 South is a four lane highway with two lanes running
each way. On the north side of Redwood Road, there is a
collection lane for vehicles turning left. There was a signal
semaphore at the time of the accident at the intersection
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with three operating colors- red, green and caution (R.
259). The speed limit on Redwood Road is 40 m.p.h. (R.
264) . At the time of the accident there was no collection
lane for vehicles south of 3500 South (R. 265, 276). North
of 3500 South, Redwood Road widens and is narrower
south of the intersection. On the 7th day of September,
1961, Theodore Gallegos, an employee of Wasatch Construction Company, was hauling dirt from an area south
of 3500 South Redwood Road to Rose Park (R. 304). He
was paid on the basis of the number of trips he made (R.
311). William J. Jones had picked up a load of barite and
was hauling the load south on Redwood Road (T. 333).
Mr. Jones' vehicle consisted of a truck and trailer combination loaded with 25 tons of material. The truck weighed
26,000 pounds alone (T. 333). Wasatch Construction Company's truck, operated by Gallegos, was loaded with 21 tons
of dirt (R. 309).
At approximately 8: 30 p.m., the truck operated by Gallegos approached the intersection of 3500 South traveling
30 to 40 m.p.h. (T. 294, 306). As he approached the intersection, the light was red and at a point approximately 200
to 300 feet from the intersection turned green ( R. 307) .
According to Gallegos, he had been following an old Pontiac which at the intersection pulled over to make a left tum
(T. 296, 306). Jones had heretofore approached the intersection at 3500 South, pulled into the left turn lane and
signaled to make a left turn east onto 3500 South (T. 332,
335). As he was stopped at the light, he noticed cars lined
up across the intersection headed north on Redwood Road
and in the left hand lane facing north (T. 336). Gallegos
testified that he saw no such vehicles (T. 312). However,
Marcus F. Richardson, who was parked on the east side of
the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood Road, testi-
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fied there were four vehicles on the south side of the intersection on Redwood Road waiting to tum left and west onto
3500 South (T. 322).
Jones testified that as the light changed, there was no oncoming traffic and vehicles across the road started to turn
west. He pulled onto the intersection to tum east and saw
no obstructions to his making a left tum onto 3500 South.
He testified:
"A. Well, when the light changed to green the car
that was sitting at an angle started to make a turn
to the west, this was the left hand turn for it and
I checked and everything was clear as far as I
could see. I started my left hand turn and I
glanced back in my mirror, my rear view mirror
on the left to check my trailer to see if it was clearing the island in the center and at that time I was
pretty well in my turn. I was pretty well across
Redwood Road into the other road going east,
that would be 3500. And when I looked back why
those lights to the extreme east of the road, to my
south, was bearing down on me."
The Wasatch Construction Company truck, traveling at a
high rate of speed (Exhibit 23), struck the Jones vehicle on
the right hand side of the cab door knocking the vehicle 7 to
8 feet to the north and east (T. 268, Exhibit 10) and knocking Mr. Smith, who was a passenger in the Jones vehicle,
into the street. The appellant's vehicle then continued to
the east where it collided with three other vehicles on 3500
South.
Mr. Marcus Richardson, a Superintendent at Hercules
Powder Company ( T. 319), was waiting at the intersection of 3500 South Redwood Road facing west. He observed Gallegos' vehicle at 175 to 200 feet south of the inter-
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section. He stated that he heard a blast on an air horn and
when he looked, Jones had started his left turn because
there was no other traffic on the outside lane going north
(T. 319). He stated that the Gallegos vehicle pulled out to
the right of the vehicles waiting to make a left tum west onto
3500 South and passed these vehicles and entered the intersection. He estimated that the Gallegos vehicle was going
40 to 45 m.p.h. when it entered the intersection (T. 319).
He stated that the engine was roaring as if it was under
power and that he felt there was no reduction in speed up to
the time of impact (T. 319- 320). He testified definitely
that at the time he first observed the Gallegos vehicle that
it was not in the outside lane but that it pulled into the outside lane and passed stopped cars as it entered the intersection (T. 325). Mr. Gene Matthews, a witness who was
called by the appellants, testified that he was waiting for the
light on 3500 South facing east; that he saw the Jones
vehicle parked on the inner left hand lane. He testified:
(R-290)
"A. As he was observed I was just sitting waiting for
the light and I said to my wife, "Why don't that
light change?" I figured, there was no traffic
coming, and I figured he should make a turn and
I looked up and it looked to me like it changed to
yellow and this car in front of me made the turn
and about the same time Mr. Jones started his
tum.
"Q. Which way was he turning?
"A. He was turning to the east off of Redwood Road.
And about that time my wife said-there is going
to be an accident-and I heard the truck that
Mr. Gallegos was driving, being a diesel, I heard
him pick up like they was going to make the
light. * * *"
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There were no skid marks from the Gallegos vehicle at the
intersection (T. 278). The appellant Gallegos testified that
it was doubtful if you could skid a vehicle with a 21 ton load
( T. 309) . The respondent Jones who had had long experience as a truck driver (T. 329), testified that applying
brakes on a heavily loaded truck will cause the wheels to
lock and cause the wheels to slide (T. 330).
The testimony of appellant Gallegos was that as he approached the intersection, he remained in the same lane
that he had been traveling (T. 306-307). He had been
following an old Pontiac which pulled over for a left hand
tum (T. 306). As the light turned green, he saw the Jones
vehicle in the left hand tum lane (T. 307). When he first
saw the vehicle, it was moving slow to tum to the left (T.
307). He testified he was approximately 150 feet from the
vehicle, traveling 15 to 20 m.p.h. (T. 308). He stated he
stepped on the brakes, blew the horn and turned to the right
to avoid the accident (T. 308). He was unable to avoid the
accident and his left bumper collided with the Jones vehicle.
The appellants offered in evidence Exhibit 23 which was
a statement not in the handwriting of the respondent, but
the statement was signed by him (T. 341, 342). Therespondent did not recall giving the statement (T. 341) or
making statements to police as were contained in the statement (T. 341-345).
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned averdict for respondent.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT AGAINST RESPONDENT.

The appellants' sole contention on appeal is that the trial
court erred in not ruling that the respondent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The trial court denied
the appellants' request for such a ruling and submitted the
issue of the negligence of appellants and respondent to the
JUry.

In Coombsv. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 ( 1954),
this Court observed with reference to the rule regarding its
review of a trial court's decision to submit a matter of fact
to the jury's determination, and the subsequent verdict:
"The basis of defendant's appeal is that the evidence so
conclusively supports his views as to these two points
that the court was required to so rule as a matter of
law and should not have submitted the matter to the
jury. The plaintiff having won a judgment below,
the verdict is protected by a bulwark of rules firmly
established in our law. First, by the general proposition
that the judgment and proceedings in the lower court
are presumptively correct with the burden upon defendant to show error. Second, where a trial judge has
passed upon a question and a jury, presumably fair
and impartial, has made a finding, while such is not
controlling, it is at least entitled to some consideration
and should not be wholly ignored in reviewing the situation and attempting to see, as objectively as possible,
whether reasonable minds might so conclude. Third,
that the court must review the evidence, together with
every inference fairly arising therefrom, in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and similarly, must
consider any lack or failure of evidence in the same
light, which we do in reviewing the facts here."
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It has long been the rule in this state that a decision of a
trial court in refusing to rule that a party was negligent as a
matter of law will not be disturbed on appeal, unless, under
the facts taken in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination, it appears no reasonable man could but conclude otherwise. jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404,367 P.2d
191 ( 1962); Mulbach v. Hertig, 15 Utah 2d 121,388 P.2d
414 (1964); Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,
121 Utah 37,239 P.2d 163.
It is submitted that when the evidence is viewed in light
of the above rules it is manifestly clear that the trial court's
decision and the verdict of the jury are not contrary to law.
The appellants contend that in two ways the evidence as
a matter of law demands a finding of the respondent's negligence. First, it is contended the respondent was negligent as
a matter of law in failing to yield the right of way. Second,
it is contended the respondent failed to keep a proper lookout.
As to the appellants' contention that respondent was
negligent in failing to yield the right of way reliance is
placed on 41-6--73, U.C.A., 1953 (Laws of Utah 1961, Ch.
86, § 1 ) . This statute provides:
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right of way to any
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which
is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, during the time when
such driver is moving within the intersection."
It is submitted this provision makes very little change
over the previous provision. A vehicle making a left turn
need only yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle
if ( 1 ) the approaching vehicle has entered the intersection
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or (2) is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. In
Kronish v. Provasoli, 179 A.2d 823 (Conn., 1962), the Connecticut Supreme Court stated with reference to the same
statute and in holding the plaintiff who was making a left
tum not to have been contributorily negligent as a matter
of law:
"If, however, the defendant's approaching car was
neither within the intersection nor so close thereto as
to constitute an immediate hazard, and the plaintiff's
car was within the intersection, the plaintiff would
have the right of way to make a left turn ... "
The facts in the instant case when viewed in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict show that the question of
negligence was properly a question for the triers of fact.
The respondent approached the intersection at Redwood
Road and 3500 South from the north. He stopped his vehicle at the red light and was in the far left hand collection
lane. He had his left tum signals in operation ( R. 333) as
well as his lights on (R. 334). As the light changed, according to Jones, "I checked and everything was clear as far
as I could see" ( R. 336). He started his left turn. According to Mr. Marcus Richardson, "Mr. Jones' vehicle had
started his left turn because there was no other traffic on the
outside lane going north" (R. 319). Even the appellants'
own witness, Mr. Gene Matthews, testified that the intersection appeared clear, and the appellant's vehicle picked
up speed like it was trying to clear the intersection before
the light changed (R. 290). According to Jones, when he
entered the intersection, the only vehicles were those directly south lined up to make left turns west onto 3500
South. This was corroborated by the other witnesses.
Further, the point of impact on the diagram shows that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
Jones vehicle was well across both opposite lanes of traffic
and that the collision occurred almost on a line with the
edge of the road of the southeast side of Redwood Road.
The appellant Gallegos' testimony was that when the light
at the intersection turned from red to green he was some
200 to 250 feet from the intersection ( R. 307) . This was the
time Jones said he started to make his turn. Gallegos was
150 feet from the intersection when he observed the respondent who was making a left turn (R. 308). Clearly,
therefore, the evidence supports a view that at the time the
respondent started to make his left tum, the intersection
was free of any vehicle that could be called an "immediate
hazard." Further, according to both Mr. Matthews and
Mr. Marcus Richardson, the appellant Gallegos seemed to
accelerate into the intersection under power. Mr. Richardson testified that the appellant's vehicle was in the left hand
lane behind several cars, and that it pulled out behind the
cars to the right, was under full power, 40 to 45 m.p.h.,
bearing down on the intersection. The jury could well conclude that Jones entered the intersection without there being any immediate hazard but because the appellant pulled
into another lane, passed vehicles and approached at a high
rate of speed, the sole negligence and proximate cause of
the accident was the appellant's.
It is well settled that a motorist who enters an intersection to make a left turn prior to another vehicle and under
circumstances that do not manifest an immediate hazard
has the right of way and subsequent approaching vehicles
must yield. Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 74 7
( 1952) ; Kronish v. Provasoli, 179 A.2d 823 (Conn., 1962);
Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209 ( 1955). In the
latter case, this Court observed:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
"Plaintiff not only entered the intersection first, he had
nearly passed over it before defendant entered. Plaintiff was the disfavored driver until he had entered the
intersection at a time when no car ~raveling the
through highway had entered the intersection or was
approaching so closely on said through highway as to
constitute an immediate hazard. But having entered
as authorized, he became the favored driver and all
other vehicles approaching the intersection on said
through highway were obliged to yield the right of way
to him.''
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59
( 195 9) , this Court observed :
"It is clear that the defendant entered the intersection
considerably ahead of the plaintiff. The question then
becomes whether plaintiff's automobile was so close to
the intersection to constitute an 'immediate hazard'
to defendant when the latter entered the intersection.
There is, of course, no precise set of measurements by
which an immediate hazard can be gauged. It must be
judged on the basis of common sense in the light of
existing circumstances. In reference to a similar situation the Supreme Court of Delaware has said that
an 'immediate hazard' is created when a vehicle approaches an intersection on a favored street at a reasonable speed under such circumstances that, if the
disfavored driver proceeds into the intersection it will
force the favored driver to sharply and suddenly check
his progress or stop in order to avoid collision. Conversely, if the disfavored driver has made his stop and
deferred to all vehicles that would be required to go
into a sharp or sudden braking to avoid collision, the
cars far enough away have a clear margin to observe
and make a smooth and safe stop are not an 'immediate hazard' and are required to yield to the driver
already at the intersection."
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Clearly, the facts presented in the instant case raised
issues that could only be resolved by the jury. The facts
clearly will support a finding that the appellant's vehicle
pulled out of its regular lane of traffic after the respondent
had entered the intersection and commenced his tum, and
thereafter proceeded at a high rate of speed into the intersection. Further, since there were no skid marks and respondent testified that a vehicle such as appellant's could be
skidded, it may be inferred that no effort to brake was
made. In Walker v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P.2d 291
( 1954), this Court was faced with a claim similar to that
now before the Court. It observed:
"The driver going straight through the intersection does
have the right of way. This means that where the circumstances are such that if the two continued their
course there would be danger of collision, the left
turner must give way. It is recognized that right of
, way, based on direction of travel, is the best and most
easily applied rule as to driver preference at intersections. But in the very nature of things, it cannot be
absolute. If it were, in any situation where there was
considerable traffic, it would be a practical impossibility to safely make a left turn, no matter how long
one waited, nor with what care he proceeded; the
driver proceeding directly through would have complete license to commit any kind of negligence and
claim the right of way under all circumstances, regardless of speed, lookout, distance away when he observed
the left turner, and notwithstanding his own lack of
care, always lay the responsibility upon the person
making the left turn. It is so plain as to hardly warrant expression that one cannot, consistent with reason
and justice, determine beforehand that in every case
involving such an intersection collision, the driver
making the left turn is solely responsible for the mishap. As in all cases of collision, both drivers are re-
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quired to exercise that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances would
exercise for his own and others' safety, and where the
failure of a party to meet this standard is a contributing cause of the accident, no relief can be had on his
behalf. Under the circumstances here, where the defendant was in the intersection substantially ahead of
plaintiff in time, and was making the left tum when
the plaintiff was far enough away that ordinary reasonable care would require that he not insist upon
claiming the right of way, plaintiff cannot race on into
the intersection and rely on it to exculpate himself
from wrong.''
The appellants cite Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45,
169 P.2d 777 ( 1946) and French v. Utah Oil Refining Co.:J
117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950) for the proposition
that the respondent was negligent as a matter of law. The
facts in both those cases are materially different than those
in the instant case. The facts in this case when viewed most
favorably to the jury's verdict are substantially at variance
with the facts of the above mentioned cases. It is submitted
that this case is more within the rule of Hardman v. Thurman) 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 215 ( 1951) where the facts
closely parallel the claims of the respondent in this case.
There, the Court observed that the French and Cederloff
cases were not applicable and stated:
"In the instant case, the jury might reasonably conclude
that when the tanker truck stopped in the first lane east
of the center of State Street and another motor vehicle
stopped in the second lane, Mrs. Hardman was in the
exercise of reasonable case in assuming that it was safe
to proceed eastward! y. In view of the street plan at
the intersection, it might reasonably be found that it
was not unreasonable for her to not expect any through
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traffic on lane 3 in which defendants' vehicle was proceeding, since there are only two lanes for north bound
traffic north of the intersection. She proceeded cautiously, and while she was crossing the first two traffic
lanes she might well have been unable to see the defendants' vehicle since it would have been some distance south of the intersection when she first started to
turn. Facing headlights of the two vehicles which were
stopped to permit her to turn safely to the left she
might not have been able to see the top of the trailertruck 13 feet above the pavement. Under the circumstances, the jury could reasonably find that she exercised due care. The evidence was such as to warrant
a finding that she and not the defendants' driver had
the right of way.
"The evidence was such as to require submission of the
case to the jury, consequently the court did not err in
denying the motion for the directed verdict."
It is submitted therefore that there is no basis for the
appellants' claim that respondent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right of way.
The jury was instructed on the right of way issue, no exceptions were taken by the appellants and the jury determined the facts against the appellants. That verdict should
stand.
The appellants contend that the respondent was negligent as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout.
The record reflects that the jury was full instructed and
advised on that issue. They apparently felt that ( 1) the
respondent maintained an adequate lookout under the circumstances, and/or (2) that any failure to maintain an
adequate lookout was not the proximate cause of the accident.
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The major basis for the appellants' position is the testimony of the respondent (R. 336--337) to the effect that as
he started his turn, and after checking to see everything
"was clear," he thereafter "glanced back" in his mirror to
check to see if his trailer was clearing the island. When he
looked back, the appellant's vehicle was "bearing down."
The appellants further contend that the respondent's statement made to the police that he thought he had a green tum
light with him supports their contention. The respondent
denied making such a statement, and the statement was not
in his handwriting. The jury might well believe the respondent's testimony that he did not so state, nor did he misunderstand the semaphore. Therefore, this allegation of
the appellants could have been properly disregarded by the
jury, and therefore in viewing the facts most favorable to
the respondent, the appellants may only rely upon the respondent's testimony.
The facts concerning the accident clearly reveal that the
jury was properly allowed to decide the matter. When the
respondent was starting his tum the appellant's vehicle was
far down the road behind several other cars. The respondent's view of both approaching lanes would show no danger.
The respondent merely "glanced backward." This would
be a reasonable and prudent action, since if the trailer did
not clear the island, the vehicle would be a serious hazard
to oncoming traffic. The respondent then looked forward,
and appellant's vehicle had moved out of the lane it was in
and was speeding forward possibly to make the light. Nothing the respondent could have done would have prevented
the accident for the sole and proximate cause was the speed
and action of the appellant's vehicle. The respondent had a
right to rely upon nonfavored drivers slowing down at the
intersection and yielding the right of way. 8 Am. Jur. 2d,
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Automobiles and Highway TrafficJ § 736. Generally, the
question of whether a proper lookout was maintained under
the circumstances is a jury question. In Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P.2d 788 ( 1956), this Court observed on the lookout question:
"Rarely do two motor vehicles collide without a claim
and counterclaim by the drivers that failure to keep a
proper lookout has at least contributed to cause the
misfortune. As a consequence this court has many
times considered the duty of a driver to keep such lookout under varying circumstances and conditions. Modern traffic complexities make it impossible to lay down
by judicial rule what will always be, or fail to be, reasonable care in the operation of motor vehicles. The
duty to keep a proper lookout is manifest but the
obedience to or violation of that duty must be determined according to particular circumstances and in
full accord with the constantly varying exigencies
occasioning each accident. As to what constitutes a
proper lookout is usually, therefore, a latter-day classic
question for jury determination, and each trial and
appellate court must determine the question as a matter of law only when convinced that reasonable persons could not disagree upon the question when conscientiously applying fact to law."
See also Spackman v. CarsonJ 117 Utah 390, 216 P.2d
640; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772.
Certainly the facts in this case raise a jury question. The
jury might well have decided that the appellant's speed
and operation of his vehicle was the sole proximate cause.
That in view of the way appellant's vehicle pulled out of the
lane it was in, over into the far hand lane which was narrow
and approached at a high rate of speed, that any momentary glance by the respondent was of little concern, see
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Hardman v. Thurman, supra, and that the proximate cause
of the collision was appellant's speed. A similar situation
existed in Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209
(1955) where in an excellent opinion by Justice Worthen,
this Court observed :

"There is no question that plaintiff, under the most
favorable evidence, was careful and free from negligence as he began to move from the stop sign. It is
urged that plaintiff was looking west and continued
to do so as he entered the intersection when he should
have been looking for traffic from the east. But until
plaintiff reached the center of the intersection he was
concerned only with traffic coming from the west.
"The evidence discloses that plaintiff looked to the east
when he was about 10 feet north of the center line at that time defendant was about 150 feet east of the
point of impact."

* * *
"To say that a person is negligent as a matter of law for
traveling across a through highway at 5 or 6 miles an
hour is to say that many people with truck, tractor,
farm equipment and wagon have no rights, and cross
such highway at their risk.
"We are not ready to say that as a matter of law plaintiff
was guilty of negligence in traversing said intersection
at that speed. It was a proper question to be answered
by the jury under proper instructions. The jury answered it in the negative.
"Let it be assumed that the plaintiff was negligent in
not looking as he crossed over the center line and into
the northbound lanes of traffic, still, that negligence,
if any, was not shown to be the proximate cause or a
proximately contributory cause of the collision. Plaintiff's position and defendant's position were still as safe
at the time plaintiff crossed the center line and until
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he was 10 feet beyond as if he had diligently surveyed
the highway.
"Had plaintiff looked just prior to, or at the time of,
crossing the center line, defendant's position would
not have alerted plaintiff to any danger- then defendant would have been further away from the intersection than at the time he did look. Had plaintiff
looked it would not have affected defendant's driving
or speed. Defendant testified that he never saw plaintiff till defendant was within 100 feet of the intersection. Unless plaintiff had been able to cast some
hypnotic spell over defendant his looking earlier would
have had no effect on the collision.
"It is suggested that if plaintiff had looked before he
crossed the center line he could have stopped or
speeded up or turned to the left. However, had plaintiff looked as he was about to start across the center
line, there would have been nothing to alert plaintiff
to any danger or occasion for a changed course. Defendant was then still further away. Any sense of danger would have been less then, than 2 seconds later.
He had the right of way. He was in the intersection
while defendant was from 200 to 300 feet away. Plaintiff would not have been called upon to do anything
different to protect himself or defendant.
"How then is the situation when plaintiff ( 10 feet over
into the northbound traffic lanes) sees defendant in a
40 mile zone 150 feet away? What did plaintiff do
then that he should not have done or what did he fail
to do that he should have done?
"Plaintiff testified that he speeded up a little. That
would seem to have been prudent. His pick-up truck
pretty well obstructed the inside lane of the northbound road. Had he stopped then as quickly as possible, his truck would have pretty well obstructed the
high\vay. Had plaintiff's truck been so stopped it
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would have required defendant to go off the highway
on the north side or to cut in behind the pick-up and
cross over onto the southbound lanes of traffic.
"We believe the question of plaintiff's contributory
negligence was a jury question which they resolved in
plaintiff's favor. We are likewise satisfied that they
correctly found that issue in favor of plaintiff."
It is submitted the trial court acted properly in leaving
the matter to the jury under proper instructions.
The appellants' claim of error has no basis in law.
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CONCLUSION
The facts of the instant case show that the appellants'
contention that the trial court should have directed averdict in favor of appellants as a matter of law is without
merit. The evidence discloses that the facts that had been
found by the jury would justify the jury's verdict. The instant situation is one where viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to the trial court's decision, it would appear that
the appellant's vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed, in
apparent effort to make the light at the intersection, and
with the pressure of additional money for additional trips,
was responsible for the collision. The legal principles relied
on by the appellants when viewed against the facts discloses
that they are not entitled to relief on appeal. The jury had
the chance to view the witnesses, to examine the exhibits
and photographs, to determine the candor of the witnesses
and concluded that judgment should be awarded to respondent. The trial court, having heard the evidence first
hand, determined that there was a jury question. The record on appeal does not demonstrate that these nine reasonable minds were completely unreasonable.
This Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON & BALDWIN
Attorneys for Defendants,
Third Party Defendants
and Respondents
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